We examine the importance of financial constraints for firm investment by looking at the relationship between investment expenditures and proceeds from voluntary asset sales. Asset sales provide a cleaner indicator of liquidity than cash flows since it appears not to be positively correlated with investment opportunities. The cross-sectional differences in firm investment are examined using an endogenous switching regression model with unknown sample separation. We find that cash obtained from asset sales is a significant determinant of corporate investment and that the sensitivity of investment to proceeds from asset sales is significantly stronger for firms that are likely to be financially constrained.
There is a large body of literature that suggests that because of information asymmetries and capital market imperfections, corporate investment expenditures are strongly influenced by a firm's ability to internally generate cash. In an influential study, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) show that firms that pay no dividends demonstrate higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow and suggest that investment-cash flow sensitivity reflects the tighter liquidity constraints faced by these firms. There has been subsequent empirical evidence supporting this finding, particularly for firms that are young, small, pay no dividends, and have no bond rating. In another prominent study, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) show that investment is much more sensitive to internal 1 There is also a growing parallel literature that addresses some of methodological problems that were originally outlined in Poterba's (1988) discussion of the Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) paper. The first strand of this literature questions how firms are classified into financially more or less constrained groups. For example, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , applying an alternative approach to classifying firms into financially more or less constrained, report that the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is not monotonic with respect to financial constraints. In particular, it is the lowest for firms that they classify as being the most likely to be financially constrained. 2 The second strand of the literature addresses issues relating to measurement error in Tobin's Q. Specifically, if investment opportunities are not measured properly, then cash flows, in addition to conveying information about internal liquidity, may also reflect information about future investment opportunities that are not captured by proxies for Q. Since the measurement of Q incorporates firm market value, this effect is likely to be more severe for firms suffering from problems of information asymmetry, which are also the firms that are most likely to be financially constrained. As a result, we might expect higher estimated coefficients of cash flow in investment regressions for firms a priori classified as financially constrained.
Using alternative approaches that mitigate the problems with measuring Q, recent literature casts doubt on the notion that investment-cash flow sensitivity is a reliable indicator of financial constraints. Some studies find insignificant investment-cash flow sensitivities for unconstrained as well as constrained firms. 3 Other studies argue that investment-cash flow sensitivities could be obtained even in the absence of financing constraints. 4 This study, which examines the relationship between funds obtained from voluntary asset sales and firm investment expenditures, addresses both strands of the literature. Specifically, to address the issue raised by the exogenous classification of firms in the prior literature, we estimate a switching regression model with endogenous sample separation. This method avoids the necessity of a priori knowledge of whether or not a firm is financially constrained. Rather, the likelihood of a 1. For a survey of literature on this issue see Schiantarelli (1995) and Hubbard (1998) . 2. Similar evidence is also reported by Cleary (1999) . 3. For example, Erickson and Whited (2000) argue that most of the stylized facts about investmentcash flow sensitivity are artifacts of measurement error in Q, and the significance of cash flow in investment regressions disappears when they use measurement-error-consistent GMM estimators. Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner (1999) , who employ firm-specific earnings forecasts from securities analysts to control for expected future profits, also find insignificant cash flow coefficients for firms classified as constrained as well as unconstrained. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) use an alternative measure of growth opportunities instead of average Q and find that, at least in some cases, the significance of cash flow in investment regressions is due to the fact that it contains information about investment opportunities.
4. Alti (2003) provides simulations that illustrate that the observed investment-cash flow sensitivity patterns could be generated by the cross-sectional variations in the correlation of cash flow with investment opportunities even in the absence of financial frictions. firm demonstrating investment behavior, consistent with financial constraints, is endogenously determined by multiple firm characteristics. In addition, as we explain below, asset sales are not likely to be positively related to investment opportunities, implying that the estimated sensitivity of investment expenditures to asset sales is likely to be less affected by measurement error in our proxy for investment opportunities.
The prior literature provides two motivations for why financially healthy firms undertake voluntary asset sell-offs. The first is that voluntary asset sales allow firms to restructure operations to achieve higher operating efficiencies by selling assets to more productive users or by selling assets unrelated to the core business. 5 We expect that asset sales undertaken for these reasons are not likely to be positively correlated with the sellers' future investment opportunities. Moreover, asset sales from the core business are actually more likely to occur when the core business is doing poorly. Given this, we do not expect to see a relation between asset sales and investment expenditures for firms that are not financially constrained. However, the proceeds of the asset sale is likely to influence the investment choices of a financially constrained firm.
It is also likely that financial constraints provide a motivation for asset sales. Specifically, asset sales, which are privately negotiated transactions, may allow firms to raise capital in situations where the debt and equity markets are either unavailable or unattractive. 6 In this case, the causal relation between asset sales and investment expenditures is reversed but should still be significantly positive only for financially constrained firms.
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The estimates of our switching regression model reveal that after controlling for investment opportunities and cash flows, cash from asset sales is a significant determinant of corporate investment expenditures. Moreover, the estimates of the model indicate that the sensitivity of investment to both asset sales and cash flows is related to variables that are likely to be related to financial constraints. In particular, firms that are larger, older, have lower market-to-book ratios, have lower levels of financial slack, have bond ratings, and are more likely to pay out dividends demonstrate significantly lower sensitivity of investment to asset sales and internal funds.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 defines the variables and describes the sample and data. Section 2 explains the econometric methods and presents the empirical results for investment regressions on the full sample. Section 3 presents the evidence on cross-sectional differences in investment behavior based on the estimation of a switching regression model. Section 4 provides our conclusions.
5. Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) argue that asset sales promote efficiency by transferring assets to better uses, and sellers capture some of the resulting gains. John and Ofek (1995) show that asset sales lead to improved operating performance primarily for those sellers that increase their focus.
6. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) show that firms selling assets tend to be poor performers and/ or have high leverage, suggesting that asset sales provide funds when alternative sources of financing are too expensive.
7. Financial constraints can themselves generate a positive relation between asset sales and investment opportunities. In particular, it is possible that constrained firms sell assets to raise cash to fund favorable investment opportunities. However, this should not bias our coefficient estimates under the null hypothesis that all firms are unconstrained.
DATA AND VARIABLES

Sample and Data
Our sample includes manufacturing firms (SIC codes between 2000 and 3999) listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ and firms from the Compustat research file. This data file includes firms that no longer exist, so that there is no survival bias. However, we do restrict our sample in two ways. First, since we examine the relation between asset sales and investment, we consider only firms that have sold fixed assets during the sample period. Second, since we are primarily interested in the effect of financial constraints rather than financial distress, we exclude all financially distressed firm-years from the sample.
Prior studies have shown that distressed and healthy firms sell assets for very different reasons (Ofek, 1993 , Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994 , Brown, James, and Mooradian, 1994 . In particular, a marginal dollar of cash flow from asset sales is less likely to be invested if a firm is in financial distress. Inclusion of distressed firms in the sample would thus bias the results against finding a relationship between investment expenditures and internal capital. In addition, classifying distressed firms as constrained may falsely indicate that the sensitivity of investment to internal capital is weaker in firms that are more likely to be constrained (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 2000) . Our definition of financial distress is based on interest coverage ratios as in Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) . A firm is classified as financially distressed in a given year if the firm's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) is less than 80% of its interest expense in 1 year or if EBITDA is less than the interest expense for two consecutive years.
We used all the firm-years with complete data on the required variables from 1977 to 2000. Since we created negatively and positively lagged variables and scaled the variables by the beginning-of-period capital, only firms that had data for at least four consecutive years remain in the sample. The tests are conducted on an unbalanced panel data set of 9751 firm-years for 1474 firms from 1980 to 1999. The sample does not have a survival requirement and includes a substantial number of firms that no longer exist.
The sample includes firms from a wide range of size distributions measured by the book value of their total assets and capital. Unlike other studies, we are not imposing a size restriction on asset sale transactions in a given year. All qualifying firm-years are included in the sample irrespective of the size of divestitures in a given year. As a result, the average asset sales transaction is a much smaller percentage of fixed assets compared to those reported in previous studies. For example, Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994) and John and Ofek (1995) report average transaction prices of 14% and 40% of book value of assets, respectively. In our sample, assets are sold in 7733 out of 9751 firm-years, and the average transaction size for these observations is 3.2% of capital. Another reason for such a difference between sizes of divestitures is that we measure asset sales only by the amount of cash obtained in exchange for the assets while other studies use the total proceeds that may combine cash and exchanged securities. Since some of our tests are conducted for the 80s and the 90s separately, we also report statistics for the two subperiods separately.
The Model and the Variables
Our empirical specification can be summarized as follows:
Investment it ϭ f(growth oppt, liquidity, assets sales, control variables) ϩ ε it , (1) where i refers to the company, t refers to the time period, and investment is measured as the capital expenditures made by a firm during the year. Growth opportunities are proxied by market-to-book ratio, which is calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets at the beginning of each period. To measure internally generated liquidity, we include both flow and stock measures. Specifically, we include cash flow, measured as the sum of the income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization during the year, and financial slack, measured as the sum of cash and marketable securities held by a firm at the beginning of each year. The amount of cash from asset sales is included as an additional source of liquidity. The asset sales information, taken from the companies' flow of funds statements (Compustat item 107), includes the amount of cash obtained from sale of property, plant, and equipment. It understates the total value of sold assets since it measures only cash proceeds from asset sales and does not include the value of divested assets in exchange for equity or debt. Investment is measured by capital expenditures (Compustat item 128), which also include only the amount of cash spent on investment and not the value of total investment. These measures are more appropriate for the purpose of this study, since we are concerned about constraints associated with raising external cash. All the flow variables and financial slack are scaled by the book value of the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. Finally, in order to control for both effects of leverage in firm investment, we use the coverage ratio, which is calculated as the interest expense divided by EBITDA, in the investment regression and short-term and long-term leverage ratios in cross-sectional regressions.
8 In order to reduce the impact of outliers, the regression variables with extreme observations are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in our regressions are presented in Table 1 . Table 2 presents the correlations between the variables. The table reveals a very strong positive correlation between cash flow and growth opportunities measured by the market-to-book ratios, suggesting that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow may be attributed to information about future profitability that is not captured by the market-to-book ratios. In contrast, the correlation coefficient between asset 8. Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) argue that investment should be negatively related to leverage because high leverage reduces the current funds available for investment and affects the firm's ability to raise additional funds due to reasons discussed by Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) . They provide evidence that for firms with unattractive growth opportunities investment is significantly negatively related to leverage. 
The sample includes 1474 financially healthy U.S. manufacturing firms that sold fixed assets for cash proceeds at least once over the period 1980-99. Total assets and fixed assets are in million dollars, measured at the beginning of each year. Investment is equal to capital expenditures. Asset sales are equal to the cash proceeds received from sale of fixed assets. Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. Financial slack is the sum of cash and short-term investments. Investment, cash flow, asset sales, and financial slack are deflated by the book value of the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. Market-to-book ratio is the sum of the book value of total debt and market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Coverage ratio is equal to interest expense divided by EBITDA. The number of observations for all variables is 9751 for 1980-99, 4919 for 1980-89, and 4832 for 1990-99. sale proceeds and the market-to-book ratios is negative and significant, which suggests that firms with greater levels of asset sales may have poorer investment opportunities.
SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT TO FUNDS FROM ASSET SALES
The first set of tests is based on estimating the model on the full sample. Specifically, we estimate a least squares regression using first differences for all variables and year dummies in order to control for fixed firm-and-year effects. The model is estimated on the full 20-year sample as well as for the two 10-year periods of the 80s and the 90s. Both current and lagged values of all independent variables and the lagged value of the dependent variable are included in the model. 0.290*** 0.402*** Ϫ0.044*** 0.223*** Ϫ0.328*** Notes: Investment is equal to capital expenditures. Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. Asset sales are measured as the cash proceeds received from sale of fixed capital. Financial slack is the sum of cash and shortterm investments. Investment, cash flow, asset sales, and financial slack are deflated by the book value of the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. Growth opportunities are equal to the sum of the book value of total debt and market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Coverage ratio is equal to interest expense divided by EBITDA. There are 9751 observations for each variable. ***Significance at 1% level.
The regression results are presented in Table 3 . As in previous studies, investment is positively related to both flow and stock measures of internal cash. In all regressions, contemporaneous and lagged cash flow and the beginning-of-period financial slack are significant determinants of investment. Beginning-of-year investment opportunities play a very important role, too, but with a small coefficient as in most previous studies. Consistent with the findings of Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) , firms with higher levels of interest expense relative to their income invest significantly less. 9 The results indicate that current investment expenditures are associated with future as well as lagged and current asset sales. One can interpret this evidence as indicating that a significant number of firms in our sample are financially constrained, since constrained firms may need to raise funds by selling assets prior to their investment expenditures or, alternatively, they may commit to sell assets in the near future to secure external funding for these investments. An alternative interpretation is that the correlation between asset sales and investment expenditures is that firms are simply replacing old assets with new assets. In particular, firms may be selling an old line of business to free up resources (e.g., managerial time as well as financial resources) that allow them to enter another line of business. These interpretations Notes: The regressions are estimated for 1478 financially healthy U.S. manufacturing firms that sold fixed assets for cash proceeds at least once over the period 1980-99. The dependent variable is investment measured as capital expenditures deflated by the beginning-ofperiod net fixed assets. Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. Asset sales are measured as the cash proceeds received from sale of fixed capital. Financial slack is the sum of cash and short-term investments. Cash flow, asset sales, and financial slack are deflated by the book value of the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. Growth opportunities are equal to the sum of the book value of total debt and market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Coverage ratio is equal to interest expense divided by EBITDA. The regressions are estimated using first differences for all the variables and year dummies in order to control for fixed firm-and-year effects. ***Significance at 1% level. **Significance at 5% level. *Significance at 10% level.
9. We conducted a similar test for financially distressed firms. Although not reported here, our results show that financially distressed firms demonstrate a low responsiveness of investment to both asset sales and cash flow. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the creditors of distressed firms often restrict the firm from using internal funds for reinvestment (Brown, James, and Mooradian 1994). are not mutually exclusive, and indeed, we expect that both probably contribute to the correlation between investment expenditures and asset sales. However, to further explore the importance of the financial constraint hypothesis, we conduct crosssectional tests that are described in the next section. Specifically, we show that the investment expenditures of those firms with characteristics that are generally associated with financial constraints are much more highly correlated with asset sales.
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CROSS-SECTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INVESTMENT
Endogenous Switching Regression Model with Unknown Sample Separation
If asset sales are associated with investment expenditures because of financing constraints, then the observed sensitivity of investment to funds raised from asset sales should vary cross-sectionally. In particular, it should be higher for firms that are more financially constrained.
Most of the prior studies classify firm-years into subgroups based on certain firm characteristics or qualitative information assumed to reflect the degree of financial constraints and estimate regressions for each subgroup. This method assumes that the points of sample separation are known. In reality, however, the extent of financial constraints faced by a firm is not directly observable. We expect that some firms face greater financial constraints than others, but we cannot perfectly identify these firms ex ante. An exception would be, for example, the case of Japanese firms studied in Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) , where the affiliation of a firm with a keiretsu is directly observed. In most other cases, the threshold values of firm characteristics used for sample separation are based on judgment calls. This implies that the results of estimation of investment regressions on different samples may be sensitive to the choice of the criterion and the breakpoints used for sample splits. This may be one of the reasons for the conflicting findings in the existing literature, especially if the relationship between financial constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity is non-monotonic, as argued by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) .
We use an endogenous switching regression model with unknown sample separation (Maddala and Nelson, 1994, Maddala, 1986) . This approach, which was previously used to estimate cash flow sensitivities in Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) , provides estimates of separate investment regressions without a priori classifying firms as constrained or unconstrained. It is based on the assumption that the number of different regimes in which firms operate is known, but the points of structural change are not observable. The advantage of this approach is that the extent that investment behavior differs across groups of firms and the characteristics that make 10. Of course it is possible that those characteristics that are generally associated with financial constraints also describe firms that tend to recycle their capital on a regular basis. While this is plausible, we do not think it is likely and do not explore this possibility.
firms more likely to demonstrate higher or lower sensitivity are determined simultaneously.
We assume that there are two different investment regimes. In one regime, investment may be more sensitive to the availability of internal funds than in the other regime. We hypothesize that these differences reflect the extent of financial constraints faced by firms. Depending on the extent of liquidity constraints a firm may operate in one of the two unobservable investment regimes.
The model is composed of the following system of three equations that are estimated simultaneously:
Equations (2) and (3) are the structural equations that describe the investment behavior of firms in the alternative regimes. Equation (4) is the selection equation that determines a firm's "propensity" of being in one or the other investment regime. The observed investment, I it , undertaken by firm i at time t, is defined as
I it ϭ I 2it , iff y* it ≥ 0.
In Equations (2) and (3), X it are the determinants of corporate investment and Z it are the determinants of a firm's likelihood of being in the first or the second investment regime at time t. β 1 , β 2 , and γ are vectors of parameters, y* i is a latent variable measuring the tendency or the likelihood of being in the first or second regime, and u 1 , u 2 , and ε are residuals. Firms are not fixed in one regime. As described by Equation (5), a transfer between the regimes occurs if y* i reaches a certain unobservable "threshold" value. This is important since a firm's financial status may change over time, leading to a significant change in its investment behavior.
We assume that u 1 , u 2 , and ε are jointly normally distributed with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix Σ ϭ (
. This assumption permits a non-zero correlation between the shocks to investment and the shocks to firms' characteristics and endogenous switching between the two investment behaviors. Note, that var(ε) is normalized to 1 because, in Equation (4), we can estimate only γ/σ ε , but not γ and σ ε , individually. Since σ 12 does not appear in Equation (7), it is not estimable. The switching regression approach allows us to control for multiple indicators that jointly determine the group in which a firm is likely to belong without the need for splitting the sample into many smaller parts or including many interaction terms. The number of indicators used to split the samples or create interaction terms is usually limited to one or two. However, single-factor classifications may not successfully separate firms with different sensitivity of investment to internal financing. The severity of financial constraints often varies among firms of the same subgroup because of other factors that are not controlled for. Multiple factor classifications, on the other hand, increase the number of subsamples reducing the size of each group used for estimation or increase the number of interactive terms in single regressions and produce imprecise estimates. The estimation of the selection equation also allows us to assess the statistical significance of the factors assumed to proxy for the degree of liquidity constraints faced by a firm. Besides, the selection regression, which directly includes the firm characteristics, incorporates more information into the estimation of the separate investment regimes than the creation of dummy variables or sample splits.
The model is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. Although we do not observe the tendency of a firm being in one or the other investment regime, we know that if ε it Ͻ Ϫ Z it γ , the firm's investment is determined by Equation (2), and if y* it Ͼ 0 or, equivalently, ε it Ͼ Ϫ Z it γ, the firm's investment is determined by Equation (3). The likelihood function for each observation is given by
and the log-likelihood function subject to maximization is given by
In Equation (7), φ(·) is the normal density distribution and Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution.
The maximum likelihood estimates of β 1 , β 2 , γ, and σ's can be obtained using numerical maximization techniques. It is possible to test for the existence of two different investment regimes by performing a likelihood ratio test with the loglikelihood values for OLS and the switching model. If β 1 is equal to β 2 and σ 1ε is equal to σ 2ε , then u 1 is equal to u 2 and the likelihood function reduces to a standard normal density. We conduct this test later.
Criteria of Sample Separation
Size. One of the most widely used proxy variables for the level of financial constraints is firm size (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992) . Smaller firms are likely to be financially constrained for a number of reasons. First, empirical evidence shows that transaction costs of new issues decrease with the issue size. This makes external funds relatively more expensive for small firms. Second, small firms get less analyst coverage and may thus have less access to external sources of capital because of adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf 1984) . Third, large firms can raise debt more easily because they are more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. Thus, higher sensitivity of investment to internal capital in small firms will support the hypothesis that financial constraints lead to underinvestment.
Previous empirical tests of a financial constraint size effect report mixed results (Schiantarelli 1995) . When size is applied to large data sets with a wide range of firm sizes, the results seem to support the hypothesis that small firms face much higher costs of raising external funds than do large firms. However, results for smaller samples of relatively large firms show either higher sensitivity of investment to changes in cash flow for larger firms or no significant differences between size groups. One possible explanation for such evidence is that different sampling criteria may create a bias towards selecting only those small firms that have been successful and less liquidity constrained.
Our sample may suffer from a similar selection bias. First, we are using only quoted firms. Second, we are eliminating distressed firm-years. The number of distressed firm-years and observations with missing values is likely to be higher among smaller firms. Thus, our sampling criteria may exclude more small firms than large firms. However, we do include firms that are no longer in existence. We also impose a less strict restriction on the minimum required number of years of record. This is likely to mitigate to some extent the selection bias against small firms.
We measure size as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets at the beginning of each period adjusted for inflation.
Age. Similar to size, firm age may proxy for the wedge between the costs of external and internal capital (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992) . Younger and growing firms are more likely to be financially constrained. Age is proxied by the natural logarithm of the number of years a firm has been listed on NYSE, AMEX, or OTC.
Leverage. As argued by Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) , leverage may negatively affect investment expenditures in a number of ways. First, it may reduce the amount of cash available for investment. Second, due to reasons discussed by Myers (1977) or Jensen and Meckling (1976) , highly levered firms may face higher hurdles in accessing external sources of capital. To control for both effects separately we include two measures of leverage in the selection equation-the ratio of short-term debt over the book value of assets and the ratio of long-term debt over the book value of assets.
Financial slack. Financial slack may be associated with financial constraints for two reasons. Some have argued that firms with ample cash reserves are not liquidity constrained since their investment is not limited by a lack of finance (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994) . Others, however, suggest that high levels of financial slack indicate that these firms are more financially constrained (Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel, 1996 , Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 2000 , Kim, Sherman, and Mauer, 1998 , since constrained firms have more incentive to hold large cash balances. For example, Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1996) find that firms with low-or no-credit quality ratings tend to hold larger stocks of liquid assets and demonstrate higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow.
Market-to-book ratio. Firms with high growth opportunities have greater need for external financing, and, therefore, may be more liquidity constrained. At the same time, a high market-to-book ratio may indicate that the firm's growth opportunities are recognized by the market, which implies that, other things equal, firms with higher market-to-book ratios will have easier access to external funds.
Dummy variables for dividend payout and bond rating. We also include a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm paid out dividends in the year prior to the investment and zero otherwise and a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm has bond rating by the Standard & Poors.
11 Firms that pay out dividends are expected to be less liquidity constrained and firms that have bond rating are expected to have easier access to external capital markets.
Results of Estimation of the Switching Model
The switching regression model with unknown separation is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood using numerical maximization techniques. In order to account for firm-specific fixed effects, the investment regressions are estimated in first differences, and year dummies are included in the investment regression to control for fixed-year effects. We estimate the model for the entire 20-year period and its two 10-year subperiods of 1980-89 and 1990-99 . Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of the switching regression model for the 20-year sample. The estimates of the two investment regressions, presented in Panel A, demonstrate that the firm's investment behavior is significantly different in the two regimes. This difference is especially apparent for asset sales. In both regimes, investment is positively and significantly related to cash flow and the stock of cash. Although there are statistically significant differences in these coefficient estimates, they are roughly of the same magnitude. In contrast, the coefficient of the contemporaneous asset sales variable is about ten times larger in the constrained regime, and the leads and lags of this variable are significant only in the constrained regime. For the constrained regime, the sum of the coefficients for asset sales exceeds unity, which implies that a dollar of asset sales leads to more than a dollar of investment. This observation is consistent with our earlier conjecture that asset sales provide cash for investments, as well as facilitate access to external capital. In addition, the coverage ratio has a significantly stronger negative effect on investment for firms operating in the second investment regime, where investment is more sensitive to internal liquidity and asset sales. The coefficients of growth opportunities are not significantly different between the two regimes.
The estimates of the selection equation, presented in Panel B, reveal that six of the selection characteristics play an important role in determining the likelihood of a firm being in a particular investment regime. The estimates indicate that firms 11. Since Compustat reports bond ratings starting in 1981, we use ratings provided by Moody's for 1980-84 obtained from Moody's Default Risk database. 
The sample has 9751 observations for 1478 financially healthy U.S. manufacturing firms that sold fixed assets for cash proceeds at least once over the period 1980-99. The dependent variable is investment measured as capital expenditures deflated by the beginningof-period net fixed assets. Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. Asset sales are measured as the cash proceeds received from sale of fixed capital. Financial slack is the sum of cash and short-term investments. Cash flow, asset sales, and financial slack are deflated by the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. Growth opportunities are equal to the sum of the book value of total debt and market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Coverage ratio is equal to interest expense divided by EBITDA. The regressions are estimated using first differences for all the variables and year dummies in order to control for fixed firm-and-year effects. The p-values for coefficient differences in the two regimes are based on the Wald test. ***Significance at 1% level. *Significance at 10% level. 
The dependent variable is coded 1 for the first investment regime and 0 for the second investment regime. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that firms with higher (lower) values of the particular selection variable are more likely to be in the first regime. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the beginning-of-period book value of assets, adjusted for inflation. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years a firm has been listed on NYSE, AMEX, or OTC. Growth opportunities are equal to the sum of the book value of total debt and market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Financial slack is the sum of cash and short-term investments deflated by the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. ***Significance at 1% level. *Significance at 10% level.
with characteristics that are consistent with our intuition about which firms are likely to be unconstrained are likely to be in Investment regime 1. These are firms that are larger and older, have lower levels of financial slack, have lower market-tobook ratio, are more likely to pay dividends, and have bond ratings. The estimates of the endogenous switching regression for the 1980-89 and 1990-99 decades are reported in Tables 5 and 6 , respectively. Overall, the findings are consistent with those reported in Table 4 . As shown in Panels A of Tables 5 and 6 , firms operating in the first investment regime demonstrate lower sensitivity to all three measures of liquidity. However, the differences in sensitivities are much 
The sample has 4919 observations for 1023 financially healthy U.S. manufacturing firms that sold fixed assets for cash proceeds at least once over the period 1980-89. The dependent variable is investment measured as capital expenditures deflated by the beginningof-period net fixed assets. Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. Asset sales are measured as the cash proceeds received from sale of fixed capital. Financial slack is the sum of cash and short-term investments. Cash flow, asset sales, and financial slack are deflated by the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. Growth opportunities are equal to the sum of the book value of total debt and market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Coverage ratio is equal to interest expense divided by EBITDA. The regressions are estimated using first differences for all the variables and year dummies in order to control for fixed firm-and-year effects. 
more dramatic for asset sales. Unlike the previous results, growth opportunities are more important for firms that operate in the first investment regime in the decade of 1980-89 and become less important for the same kind of firms in the decade of 1990-99. Panels B present the results of the selection equation. As before, firms that are larger, older, have lower market-to-book ratio, have lower financial slack, and are more likely to pay dividends are more likely to operate in the first investment regime where investment is less sensitive to internal funds and asset sales. Longterm leverage is significantly negative in the results for the 80s, indicating that 
The sample has 4832 observations for 941 financially healthy U.S. manufacturing firms that sold fixed assets for cash proceeds at least once over the period 1990-99. The dependent variable is investment measured as capital expenditures deflated by the beginningof-period net fixed assets. Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. Asset sales are measured as the cash proceeds received from sale of fixed capital. Financial slack is the sum of cash and short-term investments. Cash flow, asset sales, and financial slack are deflated by the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. Growth opportunities are equal to the sum of the book value of total debt and market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Coverage ratio is equal to interest expense divided by EBITDA. The regressions are estimated using first differences for all the variables and year dummies in order to control for fixed firm-and-year effects. 
firms with lower leverage are less dependent on internally generated cash. It becomes positive and marginally significant in the 90s. The existence of two distinct investment regimes can be tested with a likelihood ratio test. The problem with a switching model is that under the restriction that the coefficients of the two investment regimes are equal, the parameters of the selection equation are not identified which complicates the calculation of the degrees of freedom. It is also possible that the asymptotic likelihood ratio statistic does not have a χ 2 distribution. We rely on the results of the Monte Carlo tests conducted by Goldfeld and Quandt (1976) , suggesting that the χ 2 distribution can be used to conduct a likelihood ratio test by defining the degrees of freedom as the sum of the number of constraints and the number of unidentified parameters. The calculations for our model yield 57 degrees of freedom. Given the critical value for the χ 2 distribution at the 1% level with 57 degrees of freedom, we can easily reject the possibility of similar investment behavior by all firms at any conventional level of significance for both estimated specifications. Two distinct investment regimes describe the data significantly better than one regime.
To test the robustness of our results we also estimated separate investment regressions based on simple a priori classifications of our sample firm-years into subsamples of financially more or less constrained firms, instead of endogenously determined regimes, and compared the results. To form our subsamples, we used the selection variables that were found to be significant in the switching modelsize, age, market-to-book, financial slack, dividend payout, and bond rating. For continuous selection variables, we used the sample median to create the ex ante groupings. Although not reported, the results, overall, are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the switching regression results. However, they are much weaker and less convincing. One of the potential problems with a priori classification is that we have to use our discretion to classify firms into constrained and nonconstrained groups, and make that choice based on only one variable.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the relation between proceeds from voluntary asset sales and firm investment using an extension of the Q model of investment. The evidence suggests that funds from voluntary divestitures provide an important financing source for financially constrained firms. Specifically, firms invest more when they generate cash from asset sales and the extent to which they do this tends to be related to firm characteristics that are likely to be associated with financial constraints.
The findings in this paper provide strong evidence that cross-sectional differences in financing constraints have significant effects on corporate investment expenditures. This evidence is consistent with a substantial literature on financial constraints that focuses on the sensitivities of investment expenditures to cash flows. The existing literature, however, has been criticized because cash flows are likely to measure investment opportunities as well as corporate liquidity. Our tests, therefore, provide an important contribution to this debate because it is unlikely that our cross-sectional results could be driven by a correlation between asset sales and growth opportunities.
Although our analysis suggests that financing constraints at least partially explain why firms invest more when they sell assets, we do not explain the causal relation between these two variables. One possibility is that financially constrained firms take on existing positive NPV projects that they would have otherwise passed up when they receive the proceeds from an unrelated asset sale. Another possibility is that financially constrained firms choose to finance new investment opportunities by selling assets. Both explanations require financial constraints; however, the direction of causation between asset sales and investment is very different. Although it is likely that in reality both explanations are important, at this stage we cannot distinguish between the two possibilities.
Future research should probably also consider other explanations for the relation between investment expenditures and asset sales. Perhaps, this relationship arises because firms are constrained in ways that have nothing to do with capital. For example, firms may have only limited amounts of managerial time and are thus forced to eliminate a line of business before they can add a more promising line of business. While this explanation is plausible, one would have to argue that the firm characteristics that appear to be associated with financing constraints are really measuring managerial constraints. This is unlikely, but probably should be considered in future work.
LITERATURE CITED
